CARL ROGERS IN DIALOGUE WITH MARTIN BUBER: A NEW ANALYSIS*

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Carl Rogers was renowned for his work as a psychotherapist and facilitator. During his life, he engaged in a series of fascinating public dialogues with a number of other noted intellectuals (see Kirschenbaum & Henderson, 1989). In this essay, we summarize our studies of one of these remarkable conversations—an instance of what Michael Oakeshott (1975) aptly termed an "unrehearsed intellectual adventure" (p. 75)—between Carl Rogers and the philosopher of dialogue Martin Buber.

This 1957 public conversation was significant because through Rogers's writings, especially following this meeting, many thousands of readers in the United States were introduced to Buber's thought. In addition, the dialogue was a critical incident in the careers of both Buber and Rogers. Although it has been cited often to distinguish their approaches to dialogue, all previous commentators have assumed that Buber and Rogers were on equal footing and ignore the communicative process of the meeting in favor of analyzing its content.

APPROACHING THE BUBER-ROGERS DIALOGUE

We became interested in this dialogue through our research into Carl Rogers's "philosophical praxis" of dialogue (Cissna & Anderson, 1990), an approach largely consistent with Buber's thought. After Kirschenbaum and Henderson (1989) published transcripts of Rogers's dialogues with noted intellectuals, we decided that these public conversations could extend our theoretical and philosophical understanding of the process, the "how" of dialogue. We focused temporarily on the Buber-Rogers dialogue in our paper for the 1991 Buber conference and became captivated by the rich implications of this one conversation. We have not yet returned to the broader project (Anderson & Cissna, 1996, 1997; Cissna & Anderson, 1994).

Our study of the Buber-Rogers dialogue has been productive, we think, for four reasons. First, we have demonstrated the usefulness of close rhetorical and communicative analysis of significant face-to-face meetings. Virtually all critical scholarship on dialogue has focused on the concepts of noted philosophers or theorists, charting the implications or distinctions among these ideas. Few studies have engaged in close, critical examination of people's efforts to create dialogue. Despite shelf after shelf of rhetorical analyses of public speeches, social movements, and various mediated events, scholars only rarely attempt to explore critically the rhetoric of a single public conversation. Second, the project has deepened our understanding of both Buber and Rogers, as thinkers and as communicators. They were conceptually similar yet nonetheless
very distinct thinkers, and both were known as talented communicators. Existing studies have examined similarities and differences between their ideas. We enhance the intellectual portraits of Buber and Rogers by focusing on their rather dissimilar interpersonal styles in action. Third, this research extends scholarly interest in this one revealing event of dialogue. For years, Maurice Friedman almost single-handedly has sustained interest in the Buber-Rogers dialogue as a significant event. Our approach complements Friedman's concern for what the dialogue teaches with a concern for how the dialogue developed. Finally, by illuminating the internal dynamics of the dialogue itself, we hope to contribute to a broader contemporary scholarly conversation about dialogue. By focusing on a specific dialogic event, we show that dialogue is not "an ideal possibility seldom realized," as R.D. Laing said of confirmation (1969, p. 98), but a practical achievement coauthored anew in each concrete instance.

Our central argument is that previous commentaries about this event have ignored (a) the roles explicitly assigned to Buber and Rogers, (b) the presence of two non-participating audiences, and (c) the different interpersonal styles demonstrated by the two men. By clarifying the nature and function of these three features, we demonstrate the impact of the event's interpersonal dynamic and the lessons it teaches about dialogue. We discuss each of these issues after briefly reviewing the event's historical and intellectual context and summarizing the conversation itself.

CONTEXT OF THE DIALOGUE

Both participants and observers believed that this encounter was indeed a "dialogue." Immediately after the event, Buber noted that because Rogers "brought himself as a person" to the event it became a "real dialogue" (Friedman, 1991, p. 370). This was significant because in a paper delivered a month before at the Washington School of Psychiatry and published that year in Psychiatry, Buber argued that public dialogue was "separated by a chasm from genuine dialogue" (1957, p. 113). Yet, several years later when this lecture was reprinted in The Knowledge of Man, Buber's experience with Rogers had changed his mind (see Buber, 1965, p. 184), and he directed that this paragraph be deleted.

Rogers also commented immediately following the dialogue that it "went very well" (Pentony, 1987), and mentioned in an interview shortly before his death that he and Buber had had "a very good dialogue" (Rogers & Russell, 1991, p. 201). Friedman, too, called this meeting a dialogue, both in his concluding remarks that evening and subsequently in print (1983b, 1986, 1991, 1994). Other critics have expressed similar views (Anderson, 1982; Arnett, 1982; Brink, 1987; Burstow, 1987; Seckinger, 1976).

The event itself occurred at the University of Michigan on April 18, 1957, during Buber's second U.S. tour. Buber's views on dialogue were influential and respected. Buber was well acquainted with Friedman and his work and had read several of Rogers's papers. By 1957 Carl Rogers, age fifty-five, had published a number of influential works, including Counseling and Psychotherapy (1942) and Client-Centered Therapy (1951), and his "client-centered" approach was an important and distinct theory of psychotherapy. He had become acquainted with Buber's work during his years at the University of Chicago and believed it supported his own emerging theory of the therapist-client relationship. The previous year Rogers received the American Psychological Association's Distinguished Scientific Contribution Award and had the first of his famous interchanges with behavioral psychologist B.F. Skinner. Buber and Rogers met for the first time about an hour before the dialogue began. In 1957 Maurice Friedman was a young professor of philosophy at Sarah Lawrence College and a leading Buber scholar, having translated several of his books and published Martin Buber: The Life of Dialogue (1955). Friedman corresponded with Rogers and sent several of Rogers's then-unpublished papers (from On Becoming a Person [Rogers, 1961]) to Buber.
One highlight of Buber's 1957 tour was the conference devoted to him at the University of Michigan. Friedman describes the evening dialogue, with an audience of four hundred, as the "most notable event" of the several-day conference (1991, p. 368).

The ground rules for the event were somewhat unusual given Buber's emphasis on spontaneity in dialogue. Friedman described his function as "moderator" as "only, if the occasion should arise, to sharpen these issues or interpret one way or another." He also prescribed the roles of Buber and Rogers very clearly: "And the form of this dialogue will be that Dr. Rogers will himself raise questions with Dr. Buber and Dr. Buber will respond, and perhaps with a question, perhaps with a statement."

THE DIALOGUE

The dialogue followed brief introductions by Rev. DeWitt Baldwin, who told the audience to expect a one-hour discussion, and Friedman. It was fueled by six questions, the first four asked of Buber by Rogers, the fifth asked of Buber and the sixth of Buber and Rogers by Friedman.

Rogers began with a slightly light-hearted phrasing of a biographical question, asking Buber: "How have you lived so deeply in interpersonal relationships and gained such an understanding of the human individual, without being a psychotherapist?" The highlights of Buber's response included: (a) a 5.7 second pause by Buber, during which Rogers was silent; (b) Buber's description of a crucial autobiographical episode that was so personal he never was able to write about it; (c) Rogers's summarizing and organizing Buber's response into a "threefold answer" to which Buber responded, "Just so"; (d) Rogers's interrupting the flow of the conversation in order to move the table so that he could face Buber and the microphone simultaneously; and (e) first Friedman and then Buber telling stories illustrating the naive ignorance of Jews by Christians.

Buber's willingness to talk about psychotherapy evidently conflicted with advice he had received. Rogers reported that an hour or so before the dialogue Buber had mentioned that his sponsors had "told him not to speak with Rogers about psychotherapy."

Rogers said he could not imagine what else they could discuss meaningfully together and decided that although Buber "might not be able to speak to him about psychotherapy, there was nothing to stop him from speaking about psychotherapy to Buber" (Pentony, 1987, p. 420). In such a context, Rogers's opening question to Buber seems much less whimsical and more assertive. In addition, Buber's willingness to ignore the advice of his sponsors in this and subsequent answers indicates his willingness to engage Rogers.

The second question occupied nearly half the dialogue: "I have wondered," Rogers asked, "whether [3.1] your concept—or your experience—of what you have termed the I-Thou relationship is similar to what I see as the effective moments in a therapeutic relationship." Rogers explained himself at some length, and Buber's response was even longer and rather like a lecture. Rogers interrupted twice to clarify. On the whole, Rogers described his experience as a therapist, while Buber emphasized what he called the "real situation." Halfway through this discussion, Buber observed, "Now, Dr. Rogers, this is the first point where we must say to one another, 'We disagree,'" to which Rogers responded simply, "Okay." But they did not leave it there. Buber continued to explain his objection to Rogers's claim that his therapeutic relationships can be "immediate, equal, a meeting of two persons on an equal basis." Buber illustrated the limits to what he said "interests me eh more than anything: human eh effect of dialogue" by engaging Rogers on the problems of establishing relationships with schizophrenics and paranoiacs. Friedman entered this discussion and attempted to clarify the issue by questioning Rogers.

Rogers then shifted to a question about a "type of meeting which has a lot of significance to me in my work that, as far as I know, us, you haven't talked about"—"the person's relationship
to himself." Buber's response was clear and direct: "Now here we approach a problem of language. You call something dialogue that I cannot call so." Rogers indicated his wish to play tapes of therapy sessions to show how surprise, one of the essential elements of dialogue that Buber had mentioned, is present in this form of meeting. Buber identified a more general problem in psychology of not appreciating terms sufficiently.

At first Buber did not appear to understand Rogers's fourth question, concerning "basic human nature." Rogers explained that he saw human nature as trustworthy and wondered if Buber agreed. Buber replied that human nature was polar rather than basically positive. In our judgment, this was the clearest philosophical difference that emerged in this dialogue.

Rogers then acknowledged Friedman, who asked about the relationship of Rogers's concept of "acceptance" and Buber's "confirmation." The difference between them seemed at least partly semantic: Rogers used acceptance as an umbrella term, "accepting the individual and his potentiality," while Buber used acceptance more narrowly with confirmation including helping the other "even in his struggle against himself." Rogers then attempted to end the dialogue, perhaps because the announced time limit had passed.

Friedman, however, asked one more question, which concerned whether the locus of value was within the person or between persons. Rogers spoke first; Buber then addressed a problem he found in one of Rogers's articles and explained the difference between an individual and a person. Rogers evidently agreed with this distinction, very softly saying "Correct" as the closing utterance, after which Friedman briefly thanked the participants and the audience. This was the least revealing segment of the dialogue—both in terms of interchange (there was almost none) and content.

**ENFOLDED ROLES AND COMPLEMENTARY CONVERSATION**

Although this conversation was in many ways dialogical, it also resembled an interview and a classroom lesson. The occasion had been arranged well in advance, and both Buber and Rogers were told what was expected of them during the evening. These expectations are manifest in "roles."

Roles are patterns of behavior that become identified with interpersonal positions and are sometimes distinguished as social (e.g., student and teacher) or emergent (e.g., a person in a relationship who often initiates or terminates conversation). Conversational roles are usually emergent and rarely explicitly structured—especially when genuine and spontaneous dialogue is desired. The roles provided to Buber and Rogers ("Dr. Rogers will himself raise questions with Dr. Buber, and Dr. Buber will respond") are unusually explicit if dialogical conversation was expected. We term them enfolded roles, because as real but not always obvious aspects of the dialogue, they seemed to exist in the folds of the conversation's process rather than on the surface of its content.

The dialogue was a small part of a three-day conference held in Buber's honor and devoted to his thought. No doubt it seemed natural to have Buber assume the role of expert. Rogers was younger, from the host country, and had acknowledged an intellectual curiosity about Buber. Further, he was known as a skillful interviewer and facilitator. It must have seemed just as natural to ask him to take a role that was, in comparison with Buber's, secondary and functional. Communication theorists call this a complementary relationship, one based on interactional differences rather than similarities (Haley, 1963; Watzlawick, Beavin, & Jackson, 1967).

The consequences of this choice, however, were significant. Buber (1957) had previously suggested that "genuine dialogue cannot be arranged beforehand," and that each partner in dialogue must be willing "to say what is really in his mind about the subject of the conversation,"
"without reduction and without shifting his ground," "determined not to withdraw when the course of the conversation makes it proper for him to say what he has to say" (pp. 112-113). These suggestions would be difficult for interviewers to follow, especially in front of an audience, because persons in these roles have two somewhat contradictory responsibilities: to contribute as participants to the conversational content, and often to refrain from contributing substantively because they are supposed to be facilitating. Interviewers, in other words, must often enable the other's talk at the expense of their own. Rogers was expected to offer questions and probes to get the conversation started and to sustain it. His enfolded role, by definition, required planning, and indeed, he prepared and brought with him the four questions he asked and five additional questions that he did not ask (Rogers, 1957). This responsibility for the process necessarily reduced Rogers's potential for spontaneity. Buber's role was to be responsive to Rogers, which, although also constraining, allowed for more ideational creativity.

We would expect, therefore, to find that a questioner in a conversation would tend to speak less than his interlocutor, to develop his ideas with less depth, to defer and yield the floor more often, to facilitate the other's talk with assists and encouragements, to check more often on the other's meanings, to introduce more transitions of topic, and to be less overtly concerned with maintaining face. Conversely, the authority in such a situation would tend to speak at greater length, more often, to develop his ideas more fully, to express his ideas with greater certainty, and to be less concerned with understanding the other's ideas.

We are not suggesting that this interaction was totally one-sided or that Rogers constantly deferred to Buber while Buber always asserted his authority. Far from it. What Haley (1963) called the struggle to define the relationship is evident occasionally. Still, our reading of this dialogue is informed by realizing that their relationship in this dialogue, driven in part by their enfolded roles, is basically complementary. For example, late in the dialogue Buber and Rogers respond to Friedman's question about acceptance and confirmation. Buber responds first, then Rogers; and, in the most commonly cited transcript, Buber appears to get the last word before Friedman changes the topic with another question (1965, p. 183). Actually, in language edited out of that transcript, Rogers terminated their exploration of that topic and attempted to end the dialogue ("I just feel that one, us, difficulty with a dialogue is that there could easily be no end, but I think that, uh, both in mercy to Dr. Buber and to the audience . . ."). Although this could be interpreted as Rogers not wanting to engage Buber fully, a more plausible explanation concerns Rogers's assigned role. As the evening had already lasted more than the promised one hour, Rogers probably chose to enact his functional role—perhaps even assuming some of Friedman's role as moderator as Friedman assumed Rogers's role as questioner—in an attempt to end the event. In this act, we see Rogers's willingness to speak less, to develop his ideas in less depth, to defer to Buber, and to introduce transitions (and conversely, Buber's willingness to accept the positions complementary to those). Were they not constrained by the enfolded roles, we might have heard Rogers's response to Buber's analysis of the difference between acceptance and confirmation.

Thus, any examination of the dialogue that attempts to probe intellectual differences between Buber and Rogers must consider the quasipolitical effects of enfolded roles. Unfortunately, this has not happened. Previous accounts presume that Buber and Rogers engaged in a spontaneous and unrehearsed dialogue where each conversant was equally able to articulate his ideas (Arnett 1981, 1986, 1989; Brace, 1992; Brink, 1987; Burstow, 1987; Friedman, 1983b, 1985, 1986, 1991, 1994; Peterson, 1976; Roffey, 1980; Seckinger, 1976). Although Buber plainly assumed such freedom because he correctly understood the focus of the dialogue to be on him, he was perhaps constrained in other ways. For example, his assigned role made it less likely that his skills as a listener would be fully revealed. Rogers, on the other hand, could be expected to have felt constrained by his role to leave at least some of his own ideas less well developed. Although the
dialogue was a significant intellectual interchange, role definitions limited a thorough exploration of Rogers's concepts relative to Buber's, and in many ways—as Buber himself would have predicted—this choice did not serve Buber particularly well either, for the interactional ground upon which his conversation partner could stand was certainly different and in some ways less secure than his own.

AUDIENCE AS COAUTHOR OF THE BUBER-ROGERS DIALOGUE

Audiences are not merely passive recipients of messages but are active coauthors of the meanings of communication. An auditor is an active partner—in some ways a coauthor—of the meanings developed by a speaker. That is, to some extent, messages are not just what someone wants to say, but also what one wants an audience to hear and what one believes is "called for" in a particular situation. Thus, it is misleading to consider ideas apart from audience influences.

Obviously, each man was speaking to his partner and, to that extent, expected the other to be his audience, along with Friedman and DeWitt Baldwin. Less obvious to readers of the transcripts may be two additional audiences who "silently participated," as Friedman put it at the close of the dialogue. The four hundred people who listened in Rackham Auditorium that evening constituted one audience; the tape recorder that functioned to preserve the dialogue served as a marker of an even more distant and far larger potential audience. The influences of these audiences on the dialogue also have not been considered by previous commentators.

Buber came to his meeting with Rogers believing that dialogue could not be conducted in public and apparently having rather low expectations for this encounter. He refused to have his lectures in Washington, D.C., the previous month filmed, despite his host having secured a grant for that purpose (Buber, 1991) or even to have them audio-recorded (Friedman, 1991, p. 362). Buber argued that recording oral discourse would spoil the spontaneity that was necessary for dialogue and that speakers would tend to court favor with the audience rather than to address themselves to one another. Further, he thought that dialogue was compromised when additional people are present but expected to remain silent (Buber, 1957, 1965).

Conducting a tape-recorded dialogue before a public audience presents unique rhetorical challenges to the participants. While the conversants are expected to be partners in dialogue, open to the other's ideas and willing to examine their own, they are also, in a sense, "performing" for both immediate and deferred audiences. We cannot know with certainty how such audiences influenced this conversation. Research concerning the broadcast news interview, a genre similar in some ways, suggests that the presence of an audience affects how participants frame their own and others' status and how interactants characterize others' talk (see Heritage, 1985, pp. 99-112).

Consistent with such evidence and with Buber's own ideas about audience, we speculate that the presence of observers to a dialogue could foster:

1. A subtle sense of competition—which might reduce the likelihood of change or of a speaker acknowledging being changed.
2. A desire to speak for voiceless audience members—perhaps encouraging such references as Rogers's "consideration for the audience."
3. A preoccupation with the permanence of one's remarks—which would encourage safety and reduce spontaneity.
4. A concern for the dramatic requirements of the occasion—which might result in such light jokes, cleverness, and storytelling as are found early in the dialogue.
5. An exaggeration of both agreement and, at times, differences—arising from the sometimes competing desires to be seen as cooperative and to establish one's own identity in the eyes of the audience.
6. A tendency to take longer conversational turns—more like mini-speeches, designed to provide conceptual background or amplification for the audience.

7. A need to satisfy the time requirements of the event—perhaps terminating the conversation prematurely or extending it past its moment (e.g., "since I see time is going by," said Rogers.)

In this dialogue, a procedural influence of audience was created through the decision to assign Buber and Rogers conversational roles, which undoubtedly would not have happened had they talked privately in someone's living room that evening. In the example discussed earlier, Rogers is acting within his role and on behalf of the audience in his attempt to terminate the event.

The influence of audience on interaction processes can also be found throughout the dialogue, as, for example, in their length of speaking turns. Rogers never asked a short question, and Buber almost never gave a short answer. Their remarks were full of examples and illustrations to help an audience understand their ideas. Another artifact of audience is found in the stories told by Friedman and by Buber in the transition between Rogers's first and second questions. These stories functioned, at least in part, to entertain the audience. Later, in their extended discussion of the second question, Rogers, perhaps puzzled about Buber's position vis-a-vis his own, said: "Well now, now I'm wondering uh who is Martin Buber, you or me, because what I feel . . ." to which Buber and audience responded with laughter. In the remainder of their discussion of this question there were efforts to mark both disagreement (Buber: "Now, Dr. Rogers, this is the first point where we must say to one another, 'We disagree'") and agreement (Rogers: "Well, if we don't look out, we'll agree") all done with humor and in a way intended to inform and entertain the audience.

INTERPERSONAL STYLE DIFFERENCES OF BUBER AND ROGERS

As we would expect from the enfolded roles, the spotlight clearly was on Buber, and the principals adjusted both the quantity and quality of their talk accordingly. Buber dominated the speaking time, commanding 64 percent of the dialogue compared to 30 percent for Rogers and 6 percent for Friedman. In the final twenty-four minutes, after the event had gone past its allotted hour and Rogers had noted that "time is going by" and that he would "raise one other question," Rogers became even less active, and Friedman assumed the role of questioner. In this segment, Buber spoke 73 percent of the time, Rogers 14 percent, and Friedman 13 percent. Because Buber spoke very slowly and deliberately, the differences are less dramatic when we examine lines of type, which probably reflects more closely the ideational content (Buber spoke 53 percent more words than Rogers). Not only the amount but the kind of talk differed as well.

Rogers's conversational style served primarily to: (a) invite Buber to explain his ideas, (b) clarify his own understanding of Buber's explanations, and (c) highlight his own experience in relationships. As the first two are fairly straightforward, we will focus in more detail on Rogers's style of limiting his claims to his own concrete experience. Rogers frequently qualified assertions with such phrases as these from the dialogue: "it seems to me," "it has been my experience," "I say very tentatively," "I've learned from my experience," "from my point of view," "perhaps," "I wonder if," "I feel that," and "I may be mistaken on that" (cf. Cissna & Anderson, 1990). Such reservations, Rogers believed (1980, pp. 96-108), were consistent with scientific understanding of the limits of social knowledge and exemplified his insistence on accepting responsibility for personal perceptions. Thus, not only was Rogers tentative and provisional in his assertions, he was also offering his psychotherapeutic experience to Buber to be examined as a kind of "data."

Buber's style was quite different. While Rogers's style was provisional, Buber's was certain—perhaps influenced also by audience expectations that he be "the expert." While Rogers's talk emphasized invitation, Buber corrected, insisting on precise terminology. Often when
Rogers framed questions in terms of what he believed or had experienced, Buber replied with how that "cannot" be. In fact, Buber used "cannot" and occasionally "can't" to assert certainties thirty-nine times during their conversation (Friedman used "cannot" once; Rogers said "can't" twice). Although the word is reasonable in many contexts, partners in dialogue are unlikely to feel confirmed by repeated suggestions that their feelings and perceptions cannot be valid. Note these examples of Buber's certainty from the dialogue: "He cannot, by far, cannot see you"; "He is not interested in you as you. It cannot be"; "He cannot be but where he is"; "I see you mean being on the same plane, but you cannot be"; "You cannot change this"; and "You cannot say." Elsewhere we termed this discourse a "rhetoric of cannot," which is likely to be heard as a request to acquiesce to authority (Anderson & Cisnna, 1996). Because this appears inconsistent with what Buber believed about dialogue, we assume he was relatively unaware of this reliance upon authority. Indeed it is similar to the role of many European professors who patiently correct the nascent assumptions and ideas of inquiring students.

Interestingly, we also find evidence in their talk of their influence on each other's conversational styles, which may offer some additional indication of the dialogue's quality. In the second half of the conversation, while answering Buber's claim that dialogue is not present in an intrapersonal encounter, Rogers takes on something of Buber's certainty when he says, "He really is surprised by himself. That can definitely happen." Buber, late in his discussion of the second question, says "as far as I see," and somewhat later appears to adopt even more of Rogers's style, repeating "as far as I see," and also saying "My experience is," "I, eh, experience it as," and "I would say that." Further, in his response to the next question, Buber mildly deferred to Rogers's experience as a therapist ("I'm afraid I'm not so sure of that as you are, perhaps because I'm not a therapist"). Still, the dominant impressions are that Rogers's talk represented a provisional rhetoric and Buber's a "rhetoric of cannot." Overall, we must emphasize that their behavior in the dialogue was consistent with the expectations raised by the requirements of enfolded roles and audience presence that were part of the rhetorical challenge they faced that evening.

CONCLUSION

The 1957 Buber-Rogers dialogue was significant for both men and for the development of Buber's reputation in the United States. Almost forty years after it occurred, this dialogue continues to stimulate intellectual commentaries by scholars interested in how Buber's ideas influence—and can be distinguished from—the work of his followers and coexplorers of dialogic processes. The dialogue also appears to have been a critical incident in the careers of both Buber and Rogers. Following this encounter, Buber changed his opinion about whether audiences could preclude dialogue, and that October he wrote a new afterword to I and Thou that appears to address issues raised in the dialogue (see I and Thou, 1970, pp. 177-179). Rogers increasingly cited Buber's work in connection with his own therapy and subsequently expanded his focus to human relationships more generally.

This brief chapter only summarizes our investigations of this dialogue. Space limitations prevent us from including much of our argument and evidence or explaining our conclusions regarding such theoretical issues as mutuality or confirmation. We trust we have cautioned readers about interpreting the content of this or any conversation without considering the interactional dynamics that produced it, and that we have referred readers appropriately to other, more detailed studies in which we discuss our critical methodology in detail, and consider additional implications for understanding public dialogue and for understanding Buber and Rogers as thinkers and communicators.

We have much to learn from Martin Buber and Carl Rogers as insightful commentators on the human condition. We hope we have shown that we can also learn from the Buber-Rogers relationship.
NOTES

*Reprinted from Martin Buber and the Human Sciences, edited by Maurice Friedman by permission of the State University of New York Press ©1996. The title has been changed, the opening paragraph revised, and a few minor changes made. Readers may also be interested in these authors new book, The Martin Buber-Carl Rogers Dialogue: A New Transcript with Commentary, also available from the State University of New York Press (1997). Requests for reprints should be addressed to Kenneth N. Cissna, Department of Communication, CIS 1040, University of South Florida, Tampa FL 33620-7800 (kcissna@luna.cas.usf.edu).

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